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Part III
Bank Liquidity in \\Tar, 1939-1-5
The outbreak of war in Europe, and more especially our cntry into
the war, was followed by all unprecedented demand for lIIrrency
and other liquid hmds.:!7 The task of meeting this demand has
given'rise to problems that are among the most important economic
consequences of the war. Its magnitnde is indicated by the wowth
in currency in circulation, bank reserves and till money from the
middle of 1939 to the end of 1944. which was cOlISider'ably greater,
relatively, than the innease in such basic producti\'e factors as coal.
iron and steel and industrial labor. Adequate prodsion for the
increased monetary requirements was essential to the prosecution
of the war and the manner of its financing.
The Board of Governors attested to the major importance of the
liquidity problem by annollncin~ on the day after Pearl Harbor
that the Federal Reserve System was prcpared lu take steps to
assllre an adequate supply of funds for financing the war effort.:!'
'Vhile the support of the Federal Reserve and other organizations
and groups has been indispensable, the responsibility for meeting
the expansion in financial requirements has devoh-ed, initially at
least, upon the commercial banks of the country; the liquidity prob-
lem is peculiarly their problem.
From 1939 to 1945 banks were called upon for additional funds.
either £01' their own use or for the use of others, equal to more than
three times the total capital accounts, including capital, snrplllS.
undistributed profits and contingency resen'e accounts. of all in-
sured commercial banks in the country at the start of the period.
This is a slim considerably larger than their entire cash resourrcs
in 1939. Moreover. banks were obliged at the same time to prepare
for uncertain requirements during and after the war.
27 The ellecl of Ihe expansion ill currenC}" and deposils upon Ihe price slrll{lure
was Irealed ill a previous 11I0Ilograph in Ihis series and is nol parI of Ihe prt.'SelH slUdr.
see C. R. Whil(lese~', The EUrct af War ml Currrncy alld DCpOJits (Xalional Bureau
of Economic Research. Financial Research Program, Occasional Paper II. 19-13).
28 Federal Resen'(I Blllletin (Jauuary l!H2) p. 2.
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--~An analysis of bank liquidity since 1939 involves a consideration
of the factors that created a demand for liquid funds and the
sources from which the necessary funds were obtained. By far the
most important source since the time we entered the war has been
Federal Reserve Bank credit, and the chief instrument for supply-
ing this credit in just the right amounts has been the maintenance
of a posted bill rate on Tyeasury bills. Because of the major role
played by Treasury bill policy and also because it is new in this war
and hence relatively unknown, it is treated at considerably greater
length than other phases of commercial bank or Federal Reserve
Bank policy.
The liquidity of the American commercial banking system at the
start of the war in Europe was probably greater, as judged by most
conventional tests, than ever before in our history. Banks were in
a far more liquid condition than in 1929, notwithstanding-indeed,
partly because of-the difficulties experienced during the interven-
ing years and the accompanying reduction of 40 percent in the
number of active banks.
In the decade from June 1929 to June 1939 deposits ofall report-
ing banks in the United States and possessions had risen by 11.5
percent. Deposits payable on demand had increased more I'apidl}"
than time deposits, and constituted 60 percent of total deposits as
compared with only 50 percent in 1929.:''9 Much more than coun-
terbalancing this increase in the liquidity of liabilities was a great
increase in the proportion of liquid assets. Cash and due from
other banks had risen from 10.5 percent of total assets in 1929 to 28
percent ten years later. At the same time holdings of United States
government securities had increased by 367 percent, from $4,023
million to $18,791 million, becoming one of the major categories
of earning assets. Meanwhile loans and discounts had fallen by
nearly a half, from $41,433 million to $21,516 million, and a mod-
erate decline, amounting to about 16 percent, had taken place in
"other assets" which consist chiefly of bank premises.
These, then, were the main quantitative features in the liquidity
position of banks just before the outbreak of the war in Europe:
a. A relatively high ratio of demand to time deposits as com-
pared with what had prevailed previously;
29 If national bank. notes in circulation in 1929 are included, the rise in the propor-
tion of the demand obligations of bank.s is slightly less, i.e., 8.8 instead of 9.9 percent.
41b. A very high ratio of cash and government obligations to
total assets;
c. As judged by the past, a low level of fixed assets and assets
in the form of the obligations of private borrowers.
The net result of changes in these elements can be .1udg-ed only
in the light of certain factors in the institutional environment
within which banks were operating. The effect of the growth in
"cash and due from other banks" in increasing the liquidity of
bankswas partly offset, for example, by the fact that reserve require.
ments had been raised by about three·quarters since 1936, with the
result that the availability ofa partof the increased volume of "cash
and due from banks" was reduced.30 On the other hand, a more
liberal policy had been adopted as to the basis for extending Fed-
eral Reserve credit. Moreover, the fact that the Federal Reserve
Banks had undertaken to maintain an orderly market for govern-
ment securities served to render bank holdings of Treasury obliWl-
tions considerably more liquid than they might ha\'e been in the































Source: Federal Reseroe Bulletin.
s Figures for imports of gold are not reported since 1941. Some indication of the
nature of gold movements is afforded, however, by data on gold assets held by the
United Stales Trea~u'1'. As contrasted wi:h increases of U,351 million in 1940 and
5742 million in ]941, these show decreases of $10 million in 1942, Si88 million in 19411
and $1,319 million in 1944.
bDecrease.
3ij Correspondent halances which are illcluded in "cash and due from banks" do not
constitute a net resource for the bankin~ system as a whole. The~' mar, however, be
highly important to the liquidity of individual banks. .
42absence of such a policy. This policy tended to counterbalance the
effect of the lengthening that had taken place in the average matur-
ity of banks' earning assets, a change that might otherwise have led
to a reduction in liquidity.
Looking further afield, the cyclical position of business in the
second half of 1939 was favorable to the maintenance of bank
liquidity. With economic activity on an upswing. prices firm,
orders pouring in from abroad and with the prospect of participa-
tion in the war still rather remote from the United States, the
immediate business outlook was generally good. The international
financial situation was characterized by a rising flood of gold to
this country. The heavy gold inflow of 1934 and subsequent years
was given added impetus by the political uncertainty abroad that
preceded the declaration of war. For the most part, the proceeds
of these imports of gold were deposited in commercial banks; they
increased bank resen'es and at the same time enabled banks to meet
the growing demand for currency in circulation (see Table 5).
The institutional framework of banking had been strengthened
a few years earlier by the establishment of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. The protection thereby afforded small and
medium depositors by the FDIC may serve to retard, to some extent,
any tendency for deposits to be converted suddenly into cash.
Moreover, the influx of gold that contributed to the liquidity of
the member banks had likewise added to the cash resources of the
Federal Reserve Banks. Against note and deposit liabilities of
$16,212 million at the end ofJune 1939 the twelve Federal Reserve
Banks held cash reserves of $13,874 million. The corresponding
totals in 1929 were $4,132 million and $3,030 million. With cash
reserves of86 percent against combined note and deposit liabilities,
the Federal Reserve Banks, lik'e the commercial banks, were more
liquid in June 1939 than they had ever been before.
LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS, 1939-44
The first problem that arose in meeting the liquidity requirements
of the war period was to prevent a decline in the price of securities
of types found in bank portfolios.
SECURITY MARKETS AND THE OUTBREAK OF 'VAR
The immediate effect of the outbreak of war in Europe was a sharp
43decline in bond prices. During the week endingSeptember 6. 1939.
the index of United States government bond price fell from 107.3
to 103.2 and two weeks later was down to 100.8
31 The yield on
Treasury bonds. which had averaged 2.13 percent in Jnne, jumped
from 2.27 percent in the week ending August 2G to 2.;4 pcrcem
four weeks later, and similar changes occurred in the yield on
municipal and high-grade corporate bonds. Prices of comlllon
stocks. in contrast. rose almost as sharply as bond prices fell.
Security markets were again upset by the e\'cmS of December
1941. but with certain conspicuons differences. The decline in
Treasury bond prices was considerably less than in 1939. from all
index of 1I2.l in the week ending December 6. 1941 to 110.5 a
week later and 109.9 in the week of December 27. The fall in the
price of municipal bonds was about the same as it had been in 1939.
but common stocks. which previously had risen about 15 percent
within a period of three weeks declined O\'er 10 percem in the same
length of time following Pearl Harbor. The yield on Treasury
bonds rose from 1.87 percent. which was ,-ery near their low poim
up to that time. to 2.02 percem three weeks later; the yield on
municipal bonds rose from 1.91 to 2.32 percent. The effect of these
differences was to widen very markedly the spread in yields
between Treasury bonds and municipal and high-grade corporate
obligations.
In both periods the break in security prices was largely influ-
enced by the recollection of past effects of war on imerest rates and
security prices; and in both instances the temporary weakness was
met by action by the Federal Reserve officials. In the two weeks
ending September 13. 1939 the Federal Reserve Banks increased
their holdings of Treasury securities by 5400 million. During the
ensuing weeks there was gradual recovery in the bond market and
by the end of the year security prices. )'ields and the volume of
Federal Resen'e holdings of Treasury issues were not far from what
they had been shortly before the outbreak of war.
Following Pearl Harbor. the Federal Resen'e officials took addi-
tional steps to pre\'ent unnecessary disturbance in the security mar-
ket. The very next day the Board of Governors announced that,
"The system is prepared to usc it~ powers to assure that an
III !h~ decline in prices of semrities held by banks tended 10 impair 10 that extent
the hqUldin- of bank assets.
44ample supply of funds is available at all times for financ-
ing the war effort and to exert its influence toward main-
taining conditions in the United States Governmem SeCllT-
ity market that are satisfactory from the standpoim of the
Government's requirements." 32
Foralmost exactly a year prior to Pearl Harbor,thetotalofTreasury
securities held by the Federal Reserve Banks had remained constant
at $2,184 million. The increase during the course of the month that
followed amounted to about $70 million. The relative stability in
prices of Treasury securities as compared with municipal bonds and
corporate stock~ is partly a reflection of confidence in the ability of
the Reserve officials to maintain orderly conditions in the gm'ern-
ment bond market.
BANK RESERVES Ai'D CURRENCY
The preservation of stability in the security markets was of rela-
tively minor importance compared with the problem of meeting
the demand for additional funds. The two factors responsible for
the bulk of the increase in cash required from or by banks were the
growth in volume of currency in circulation and the expansion of
bank deposits. The first called for the direct provision of cash in
the form of coins and currency, while the second increased the
volumeof required reserves. A certain additional amount of liquid
funds found its way into use as vault cash. More recently the with-
drawal of gold either for earmarking or export, has assumed sub-
stantial proportions.
The absorption of liquid funds attributable to each of these fac-
tors is shown in Table 6 at semi-annual intervals from the middle
of 1939 to June 1944. Since the second half of 1940, the dominant
factor has been the growth in the volume of currency in circulation.
Out of the total increase of $20,989 million in the five years, 70.8
percent was the result of the expansion of currency in circulation,
27.1 percent of the growth in required reserves, and 2.1 percent of
the increase in vault cash. The disproportionate increase in the
amount of required reserves in the second half of 1941 was chiefly
the result of the rise in legal reserve ratios on November], which
increased requirements by about $1.2 billion.S3
32 Fe(/eml Resen'e Blllleli" (January 1942) p. 2.
33 \\'ith this exception the growth in required re5enes was due 10 the larger mlume
45REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
A further element in the liquidity needs of banks was related not
to the total demand for liquid funds. but to regional shifts within
TABLE 6-PRINCIPAL FACTORS IN THE INCREASE IN DEMAND
BY BANKS FOR LIQUID FUNDS, SEMI-ANNUALLY FROM




Increase or Required Vault ------_._-
Decrease (-)
Outside
Reserves Cash 6-Month Cumulati\'e
Danles Period from June '~9
- ._----
Total, June 1919 $6.005 $5,878 $712
1939 - December 396 566 129 $1,091 $1.091
1940-June 298 480 -52 726 1,817
December 626 487 202 1.315 3,1~2
1941 - June 8i9 430 H 1.317 4,449
December 1,411 1,524 88 3,023 7,472
1942 - June 1.321 578 -65 1.834 9.306
December 3,010 1,186 -3 4,193 IU99
1943-June 1,868 -256 123 1,735 15.234
December 3,023 777 -10 3,790 19,024
1944-June 2.044 -90 II 1,965 20,989
Total,June /944 $20.881 $11.560 $1,145
Increase, June 1939
toJune 1944 $14,876 $5.682 $431 $20,989
Soum:: Federal Reserve Bulletin.
that total. It was the phenomenon of a shortage of funds in some
areas accompanied by a surplus in other areas. Such inequalities
were largely the result ofdifferences in the rate ofTreasury receipts
and disbursements within particular areas. On balance, for exam-
------:-~-------------------------
of deposits. The action of the Reserve authorities in raising the ratio of requind
reserves in 1941 was taken after a year of more or less steady decline ill excess
reserves, which had reduced their amount by $1.750 million. The illflow of gold that
had been chiefly responsible for the growth in reserves had virtually ceased, while
the business expansion iWOCiated with the war in Europe and our OWh defmse pro-
gram bad caused a rising demand for currency and bank. reserves. The action to
increase reserve requirements might seem inmnsistent with the5e conditions and
with the steps taken not many months later to ease reserves; it was a reflection of the
general fef:ling at the time that pent-up forces of inDation were in greater danger of
bursting forth than before. This feeling was doubtlt-1S encouraged by the fact that
commodity prices, particularly of agricultural product!. had been rising rather
sharply through the year. The rise in the index of wholesale prices slowed down
following the increase in reserve requirements. but the upward movement of agri-
cullural plices. although checked, began again a little lalet.
46pIe. the Treasury was withdrawing funds from New York and Chi-
cago and certain other financial centers and pouring out funds in
areas where the growth in payments to defense industries and agri-
culture was particularly large.
The drain of funds away from New York in 1941 was no new
phenomenon. During 1934-36 there had been a heavy. and during
1937-39 a moderate. out80w of funds on Treasury account from the
New York Federal Reserve District. In the first period this outward
movement was compensated by the import of gold plus a movement
of business deposits and bankers' balances into the District. In the
second period it was much more than offset by the inflow of gold
alone.34 While the expansion in the scale of Treasury operations
after the stan of heavy war financing in 1942 was panly responsible
for the drain of reserves away from New York and Chicago. another
contributing factor was the drying up of sources that had previously
provided an offset to the withdrawal of funds by the Treasury.
Differences in the net requirement for liquid funds led to changes
in the relative reserve position of central reserve city banks. In
June 1939 the central reserve city banks in New Yo~k and Chicago
held $2.756 million or 65 percent out of a total of $4.246 million of
excess reserves in theSystem. For a number of years a high propor-
tion of total member bank excess reserves had been held by central
reserve city banks in New York City. Beginning in April 1941
theiT share fell from 48 percent of the total to 21 percent by the
middle of 1942. During the same period excess reserves of member
banks outside New York and Chicago remained practically stable
in amount. notwithstanding an increase in the amonnt of their
required reserves. A little later the withdrawal of correspondent
balances. which had assumed something of the character of first-
line reserves for interior banks, helped to bring about a virtual
disappearance of the excess reserves of central reserve city banks
in New York.35
One effect of changes in the flow of liquid funds between regions
34 Federal Reseroe Bul/elin (September 19~9) p. 711.
35 There was a considerable shifting about or interbank deposits from 1940 to 1944.
While the total of interbank balances rose during most of the period, balances with
;\lew York banks declined substantially and balances with Chicago banks rose only
slightly. Deposits with resen"e city banks and countT)' banks increased materially and
were still rising in 1944. The net effect of these changes was a certain decentralization
of interbank deposits. The following tabulation shows the volume (in millions) and
47was to calISe differences in the behavior of the reserve ratios of the
various lederal Reserve Hanks. In Jlllle 1939 the ratio of reserves
to lOtal note and deposit liabilities of all twelve Federal Reserve
TA8LE i-RATIO Of RESERVES TO !';OTE A:"O Dl:PO.~1T LI.\IUI.IT1ES-
FEDERAL Rt:SER\'£ BA:-;KS. JUSE 1939 TO D£cnIBER 19Ha
---- -------
-
Dec. Re5ell'e iI/PIe Drc. Dec. Dec. Du.
Banle I"]') 19-10 IfNI 19-12 /91J 1911 _._--- ...--------------- ._.------
Bo5lOn 81.6% 119.2~r 1!7J;~!,- 72.0'7c 56.9<7c 45.1%
NewYork 9Ll 9U 93Ji 80.2 66.11 48j
Philadelphia 79.4 86.6 89.1 -?? 55.2 1_.- 417
CIe"e1and 78.6 li6.9 1\.~.9 73.7 53.7 43.9
Richmond 73.9 83.3 8" ? 70.4 61.3 ).- 4H
Allanta 72.3 82.8 ilG.fl 73.3 60.1 495
Chicago 90.4 93.1 9'1.8 80.1 -"- 553 I .... J
St. Louis 75.9 84.9 8:;.5 710 55.3 450
~finneapolis 78.4 x4.1 86.0 75.6 51.6 45.6
KansasCity 73,3 RO.3 85.3 69.0 55.2 44.8
Dallas 710 78.7 85.5 69.7 48.8 45.0
Sail Francisco SO.3 81;.9 89.3 7t.i li5.9 54.9
.\LL RESU\£
B.\SKS 85.7% 90.8% 90.8';, 76.3';, 62.6';( 48.9%
Source: Federal Resen'e Bulletin.
• Dala for end of month except for 19-14 "'hich are for December 27.
Banks averaged 86 percent, ranging fTOm a luw of i I percent for
the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank to a high of 91 percent for the
Federal Resen'e Bank of ~ew York (Table i). In December 1941,
at the end of the period of heav}" importation of gold, rcsen"es fOI
all Banks a\'eraged 91 percent with a range of from 85 in the Kan·
sas City and Richmond Resen'e Banks to 94 in the :'\ew York Bank.



















Sourer: Federal Reien'e Bulle/in.
distribution of domestic interbank demand deposirs from June 1939 10 June 194-1.








48member banks in New York and Chicago were experiencing diffi-
culty in maintaining adequate reserves, the reserve ratios of the
Federal Reserve Banks in New York and Chicago were the highest
of the twelve Banks in the System. At the end of 1943 the Dallas
Bank held reserves of 49 percent and the Chicago Bank.. 73 percent,
as compared with an average of 63 per<::ent for the twelve Banks of
the System. A year later the spread was from 44 percent at the
Cleveland Bank to 56 percent at the Chicago Bank. with an a\'erage
of 49 percent for all twelve banks.
The explanation of differences in the behavior of reserve ratios
among the various Reserve Banks lies in changes in liabilities quite
as much as in reserves; as is indicated by Table 8 showing the dis-
tribution of reserves and note and deposit liabilities by ahsolute
amounts for each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. Between
December 1940 and December 1943 the reserves of all the Federal
Reserve Banks except Boston and New York increased; at the
Atlanta and San Francisco Banks they more than doubled; and in
the case of the Chicago Bank they increased by over 30 percent.
During 1944 total reserves dropped 7 percent and there was a par-
ticularly sharp reduction in the reserves of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank; but for most Banks changes in reserves were less
than in the preceding year. For the different banks individually
as well as collectively, the increase in liabilities has been much
greater than the increase in reserves. The ratc of increase was
greatest for the Atlanta, Dallas, Richmond and San Francisco Banks,
which also showed the greatest relative increase in reserves. \\'hile
the note and deposit liabilities of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank
increased a little morc than the average. those of the New York
Bank actually decreased. By and large, therefore, it was not the
increase in reserves but the failure of liabilities to rise as rapidly a~
elsewhere that caused the reserve ratios in New York and Chicago
to remain relatively high for so long a time. In the same way, the
rapid expansion of liabilities explains why the ratio of reserves in
certain other Federal Reserve Banks continued to fall despite a
substantial increase in reseT\'es.
Variations were also substantial among different categories of
member banks. On the average, the rate of growth in deposits was
greatest for country banks and least for central reserve city banks.
This was particularly noticeable from 1941 011. The relative
49(;t TABLE 8-RJo:SERHS ANI) NOTE ANO DI::I'USIT LJAI\II.ITlt:S 1)1' CO
FEDJ'RAL RESERVE BANKS, JUNE 1939 TO DECEMIH::R 1944"
(in millions)
- -
Reserves Noll' aml Depusit LinIJilitie.•
Resen'c Ra,", JUIIC Dcc~ Dec.--:ncc.-UCC:---Dcc: j~Dcc-:--i5ec:--oec.--DeC-Dec_
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 -
Boslon $772 $1.164 $\,192 $1,214 $\,07R $990 $946 $1,305 $1,360 $1,687 $1,895 $2,195
New York 6,515 9,810 8,212 6,930 6,001 4.956 7,149 10,391 8.753 R.645 9,01'\8 10,250
Philadelphia 710 1,066 1,245 1,17! 1,078 \.041 894 \,231 1,39i 1,625 1,953 2.331
Cleveland S5S 1,852 1,652 \,760 \,451 1.404 1,091 1.555 1.12.57 B26 2,703 5,200
Ric::hmond 3611 573 806 976 1,078 998 491-1 688 946 1.5B7 1,7tiO 2.228
Atlanta 290 401 569 789 932 966 401 4BB 662 1.077 1.552 1,949
Chicago 2.350 2,937 3,464 3,612 3,869 3A89 2,600 3,156 3.734 4.507 5,321 6.290
St. Louis 369 511 650 715 679 6% ll-Ir. fi02 7fil 1.0:'0 1.221-1 1.544
Minneapolis 262 311-1 400 186 3M 3!1!! 33-1 !I7S 465 643 714 871
Kansas City 348 436 570 674 695 Gi7 475 5H 661-1 977 1.2;,8 1.512
DaJlal 228 295 429 538 490 55,! 321 375 502 772 1.004 J.232
San Francisco 812 1,1612. 1,576 2.010 2.861 2,520 1,011 1.344 1.765 2.692 3.1)12.2 4.593
---------
Au. Rt:St:RrF.
n.\I':KS $]3,81-11 $20,036 $20.764 S20.90R $20.09(; $IR,fi91 $16.~'O4 $22.058 $22.870 $27.31-17 $32.012.7 $38,196
Source: F~deral Reseroe Bulletin.
a Figures for end of month except {or 1944 which are for December 27.changes in reserve requirements for different classes of banks are
shown in Table 9. For the entire period from June 1939 to Decem-
ber 1944 the increase in required reserves amounted to $7.045 mil-
lion, distributed among the different classes of banks as follows (in
millions):
Central reserve city banks $1,415
Reserve city banks 3.511
Country banks 2.119
Compared with the start of the period. the increase in require-
ments was 44 percent for central reserve city banks. 197 percent
for reserve city banks. and 244 percent for country banks.
Differences in the need for cash funds were substantial within
individual districts as well as between districts. For example. while
the central reserve city banks in the Chicago Federal Reserve Dis-
trict were subject to a steady drain. other banks in the District,
especially country banks and the reserve city banks in Detroit. were
experiencing large gains. This was reflected in a growth of only
71 percent in deposits ofcentral reserve city banks in Chicago from
TABLE 9-MEMBER BANK REsERVE REQUIREMENTS. 1939-44
(dollar figures in millions)
Central Resenx: ResenTe Cit),
Country Ballks City Banlts Banlu
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
Inaease Increase Increase
1959-June $3,187 $1,784 $868
December 3,613 13.40/0 1.955 9.50/0 897 5.30/0
1940-June 5,981 10.2 2,oU 5.1 906 1.0
December 4.220 6.0 2,208 9.7 9H 7.5
1941-June 4.441 5.2 2,3/H i.1 1,045 7.5
December 5.001 12.6 s.o14 27.5 1.406 34.5
1942-June 5.195 5.8 5,216 6.7 1.511 7.5
December 4.729 -8.9 4.102 27.5 1,946 28.B
1945 - Jl1ne 4,288 -9.5 4,lI94 7.1 2.150 10.5
December 4.105 2.7 4,'i81 8.8 2.516 17.0
1944-June 4.712 7.0 5,027 5.1 2,698 7.2
December 4.602 -2.5 5,295 5.3 2.987 10.7
Increase. June 1959
loJlerember 1944 1.415 44.4 5,511 196.8 2.119 244.1
Source: Federal Resent/: Bulletin. Totals are monthly averages of daily figures.
51June 1940 to June 1944, at a time when deposits of resene city
banks in Detroit were increasing hy 169 percent. Marked differ-
ences occurred even within states. Thus banks in \Vichita were
near the top and banks in Topeka not far frolll the bottom of the
list of aJJ resene cities as legards relative gTOwth in volume of
deposits between 1940 and 1944.
HOW LIQUIDITY WAS FURNISHED, 1939·44
The means by which liquid funds may be provided can be classi-
fied as those that are primarily automatic and those that are admin-
istrative or legislative. The first category includes the activation of
cash balances previously held idle and increases in gold ancl other
resen'e money. The serond comprises chiefly the creation of Re-
sene Bank credit. It may also include measures such as the T reas-
ury might introduce to provide additional money. changes in the
ratio of reserves that banks are required to maintain against depos.
its and means employed by the banks themselves to maintain
liquidity. Broadly speaking. the automatic factors were predomi-
nant in the early years of war expansion. while the administratiw
and legislative factors have been of chief importance since our own
heavy war financing began in the spring ot 1942. The principal
sources of the funds required by banks were imports of gold from
abroad from 1939 to the end of 1940. the using up of accumulated
excess resenes from early 1941 to the late spring of 1942. and the
expansion of Reserve Bank credit from that time onward. Imports
of gold had been large each year starting with 1934. Although the
net import of nearly $2 billion in 1938 was a record up to that time.
that figure was soon far surpassed. Partly in consequence of the
threat of war and then of the war itself. imports of gold TOse to S3.6
billion in 1939 and $4.7 biHion in 1940.36 The inflow of gold was
so great that excess resenes climbed steadily, despite a substantial
increase in the absorption of cash. particularly thTOugh the expan-
sion of currency and reserves held against deposits. Where excess
resenes had amounted to $4.2 billion at the end of June 1939, thev
averaged more than $6 bilJion in the second half ~f 1940, and a"t
one time reached almost $7 billion.
The movement of excess reserves from 1937 to 1943 was
36 See Tahle I aOO,'C'.
52marked by a (mious symmetry. For about three years from the
middle of 1937 to the middle of 1940, excess reserves increased vir-
tually without interruption, rising in that time from under $1
billion to over $6 billion. For ncarly thrce years, from the begin-
ning of 1941 until the end of 1943, excess reserves declined, with
hardly a pause, to approximately the point from which they had
started six years before.3T The first year and a half of the down-
ward movement (from the start of 1941 to the middle of 1942) was
the most precipitate, with a decrease in excess reserves of $4.1 bil-
lion. Thus out of a" net absorption of $6.2 billion3/l of currency and
reserves in the period hum early 1941 to the middle of 1942, about
two-thirds was supplied by drawing down excess reserves.
In the two years from June 1942 to June 1944 the absorption of
liquid funds, most of which resulted from the expansion of CUT-
rency in circulation, totaled $11,683 million (see Table 6). The
increase in currency alone was greater than the total increase in
demand for liquid funds dUTing the three years from June 1939 to
.June 1942. The expansion of currency in circulatiou took place
at a time when relatively little assistance was being afforded by the
change in legal reserve requirements, and gold was being with-
drawn rather than imported. By far the major SOUTce for supply-
ing'the unprecedented demand for liquid fuuds was the increase
in Reserve Bank credit, which rose by almost $17 billion or over
700 percent (from $2,775 million at the end of June 1942 to
$19,745 million two years later). After the stan of heavy war financ-
ing about the middle of 1942, therefore, it was pTincipally the
Reserve Banks that furnished the additional liquid funds needed
by the financial system as a whole.
While the three periods from June 1939 on are clearly defined
as to the principal sources of liquid funds, there was a certain
amount of overlapping. In the first period, for example, Reserve
Bank credit was supplied rather freely when purchases in the open
market were made at the outbreak of war in September 1939. It
was also beginning to increase appreciably at the end of the second
period. In both the first and third periods excess reserves were of
some importance in meeting the need for cash, particularly over
3;This decline was influenced in the earlier period by a reduction in legal require-
ments. and in the later period first b}" an increase and then by decreases in legal
requirements.
38 See Table 2 above.
53relatively short periods when the demand was primarily of a sea-
sonal character.
In addition certain modifications were made iu legal provisious
relating to reserve requirements. Following a precedent of the first
'Vorld War, Treasury deposits with commercial banks arising Out
of loans to the government were freed from all reserve require-
ments in April 1943. As a result of this change, required reserves
declined sharply at the time of war loan drives when balances were
transferred from private to Treasury accounts ,and rose gradually
thereafter until the next war drive (see Chart 7). From August to
October 1942. the reserve requirements of central reserve city banks
were lowered from 26 to 20 percent. This change contributed sub-
stantially to relieving the pressure on New York. and Chicago.&9
Another factor acting to provide liquid funds was the issue of small
amounts of silver currency and silver certificates. At the end of
1942 and early in 1943, also, something over a half billion dollars'
of currency was issued in the fonn of Federal Reserve Bank notes.
These additions to the supply of currency were more than counter-
balanced by the net reduction in gold stock in 1943 and 1944.
As in the period of expansion during and after the last war, the
principal problems arising out of the need for liquid funds were ot
a regional character. There was again a tendency for certain dis-
tricts, particularly those in the East, to lose reserves and for others,
particularly in the South and West, to gain reserves. In the period
of the last war these differences led to extensive borrowing between
Federal Reserve Banks, with heavy lending in the opposite direc-
tion when the flow of funds reversed itself in the subsequent period
39:\ minor modificalion in reserve requirements was lhe adop[ion in February 19-12
of a uniform period of one week for calculaling (he average resen'es of reserve ci[y
and cenlraI resen'e ci[}' banks. It was reporled [hal [his change would help 10 over-
come [he [endenq for cer[:iin banks [0 mainlain unnecessarily large excess resen'es.
see Board of Go\'emors of the Federal R.eserve S)'s[em• •irwual Report, 1912, p. 86.
Somewhat similar reduc[ions in resen'e requiremenls were elIeCled during [he lim
World War. The etTeCl of [he inlJoduc[ion of [he Federal R.esen'e S\'S[em and of
changes inaugura[ed in 1916 was 10 reduce [he reserve requiremenls of n~tional banks.
In 1917 legal resene requirements of member banks were again lowered, from 18.15-12
perccnI agains[ demand deposits [0 13-10·7 percenl, Inasmuch. however. as legal
resen'es were '1[ the same lime redefined to include onl~' deposi[s wi[h [he Federal
Resen'e ~anks, [he ne[ resuh of [he changes was [0 eliminate [he larger pall of \vha[
had prevlOush' heen COUnled as resen'es. ExcelS resenes. which had amounted 10
more [han 70 percenl of reqUired resen'es a few mOnlhs before. were reduced [0 a
lillie O\'er 8 percenl following [he IOll'e,-i1lg of requiremen[s and [he redelinilion of
legal reserves.
54ofcontraction. No such borrowing between Federal Reserve Banks
has occurred in the present war. The reason for this difference is
tobe found chiefly in the abundance of the reserves held by Reserve
Banks when the period of heavy demand commenced. Inequalities
in the rate of expansion in different areas resulted in substantial
variations in the reserve position of different Federal Reserve Banks.
Adjustments in the reserve position of the Banks have been effected
in part through the allocation of security purchases amon~ the dif-
ferent Reserve Banks.
CHART 7-REQUIRED RESERVES OF MEMBER BANKS,
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INTERNAL FACTORS RELATED TO BANK LIQUlDITY
As was pointed out earlier, bank liquidity is correlated directly
with the liquidity of a bank's assets and inversely with the liquidity
of liabilities. It depends on the extent to which cash can be real-
ized from assets with a minimum of delay and without loss of prin-
cipal. and on the extent to which liabilities may at any time be pre-
55sented for pavment in cash. The sources of changes since I~39 in
the net liquidity position of banks are to t~e t.ound. therefore: 1\1. t~le
alterations that have occurred in the prinCIpal asset and hallllm
items of commercial banks. Some of these changes are imernal to
the banks and reflect deliberate aLtioll~ 011 the part of those respon-
sible for conducting the affairs of hanks. while others are the result
of influences - including TreasUl) policy. the preferences of the
public and altered business conditions - which lie olltside the COli·
trol of bank.ers.
OUTing the decade of the twenties time deposits of commercial
bauks increased more rapidly than adjusted demand deposits. III
the early thirties. time deposits declined less than demand deposits
with the result that the ratio of time to demand deposits continued
to rise. reaching a peak of 94 percent in 1931. Thereafter the mow·
ment in the ratio was downward, interrupted by a few minor
upward swings. Following the stan of heavy war financing. the
downward mo,'ement was much more pronounced. and b~ the end
of 1944 the ratio was less than a third of what it was in I~t)l. ~Iore
recently savings deposits ha'·e shown a greater tendency to increase.
The relati"e!y rapid growth in time deposits in the twemies was
probabl}' abnormal. so that in pan the decline in the ratio of time
to demand may have represemed a readjustmem to a more typical
relationship.4fJ In addition. it was greatly influenced by Trcaslln
NJITowing: the return on war sa,"ings bonds was higher than that
paid 011 sa\'ings deposits, and the small savers who were 1\I0st accus-
tomed to make use of timedeposits were under pressure to purchase
war bonds through payroll sa\'ings plans or othen\·ise.
The declining proportion of time to total deJX>sits appears.
because of the greater stability of time deposits, as a factor operat-
ing to diminish bank liquidity. Similarly the rapid growth in large
deposits. which are more \'olatile than smaller deposits. has also
tended to reduce bank liquidity. As an offsetting factor. there has
recemly been a decrease in the ratio of interbank deposits to wtal
deposits. The shrinkage has been most conspicuous since 1941 and.
as Table 10 shows, affects all categories of hanks. Since interbank
deposits are subject to sudden withdrawal. the relati'-e decline in
their amo.lInt has tended to increase the liquidity of the larger
banks, whICh were the principal holders of interbank deposits. and
40 Quite a number of hanks. also. ceased 10 offer snings acmulII facilities.
56TABLE 100RATIO OF INTERBANK DEMAND DEPOSITS To
TOTAL DEMAND DEPOSITS, 192844
All Central Rescme City
End of Member Rc(cn'C
COlmlry
Barllu :-'ew York Chicago City
1928 16.!lo/'D 18.4% 22.!l% 21.1% 6.!I%
1929 1604 18.8 2!1.0 20.7 6.!I
19!1O 18.8 21.8 25.4 2U 6.7
19!11 16.7 19.0 24.8 2O.!I 6.2
1932 21.2 26.!I 2!1.8 24.8 6.6
l!m 18.1 20.1 20.0 22.8 6.6
1934 19.7 21.7 25.2 24.1 6.9
19!15 21.9 26.7 24.4 25.1 7.1
19!16 21.4 25.9 25.!I 25.2 6.9
19!17 20.1 25.2 24.4 2!1.!I 6.1
1938 22.0 28.4 26.1 24.8 6.3
19!19 24.7 !lO.7 !lU 27.4 7.!I
i!HO 2!1.!I 27.G !l1A 26.5 7.1
1941 21.1 24.5 28.9 25.0 7.1
1942 16.7 18.5 24.4 20.7 6.0
194!1 1!1.6 16.4 19.6 16.7 4.9
1944a 1!1.2 15.4 19.9 16.8 4.8
Source: For the years 1928·41, Banking lind Monetal)' Statiuic$, pp. 78 If.; for the
~'ears 1942-44, Member Bank Call Reports.
• Anrage of daily figures.
to decrease the liquidity of the smaller banks owning the deposits.
All available evidence indicates that the activity of deposits has
slowed down almost continuously since 1929. Despite a temporary
rise in the rate of turnover of demand deposits in 1941, by 1944 the
rate was approximately 40 percent of what it was for the year 1929.
While liquidity depends less on the total activity or inactivity of
deposit balances than on the extent to which withdrawals coincide
with the inflow of funds, the slowing down in deposit turnover is
generally viewed as contributing to a more liquid condition.
The influence of the deposit changes mentioned is somewhat
diverse, but the general tendency seems to be in the direction of an
increase in the liquidity ofdeposits and therefore toward an impair-
ment of over-all bank li(IUidity. This tendency appears, however.
to be greatly outweighed by changes in the assets of banks, which,
in contrast to changes in deposits, are largely influenced by the
policies of bank executives.
The proportion of cash holdings to deposits of member banks has
57declined since the early years of the war (Table 11). At the end of
June 1944 the total of cash and due from banks was approximately
the same ratio of deposits as in June 19j3. The decrease in the
ratio ofcash to deposits since the end of 1940 has been accompanied
by an increase in bank holdings of Treasury bills and (:enificates of
indebtedness which are, for reasons explained below, almost as
TABLE II-RATIO OF CASH AND TREASURY BILLS TO TOTAL DEPOSITS
IN MEMBER BANKS, JUNE 1939 TO JUNE 1944-
(dollar figures in millions)
Cash Plus Cash Plus Due
Treasury
Treasury Bills
Depo.{its Duefrcm from Ballks as asa % of
Ballks a % of Deposits
Bills Deposits
1939-June $45,873 $17,629 38.4% $441 1.{)tJ(
Dec. 49.340 19,782 40.1 563 1.1
1940 - JUlie 51,729 21.830 42.2 i97 1..')
Dec. 56.429 23.963 ·12.5 652 1.2
1941 - JUlie 5!!.511 22,689 38.8 1.127 1.9
Dec. 61,717 23,122 37.5 9il 1.6
19-12-June 63.401 21.722 34.3 1,509 2.4
(3,381) (5.3)
Dec. 78:277 24,.2il(l 31.0 4,363 5.6
(10.648) (13.6)
19-13 - JUlie 84.016 22.310 26.6 6,.27K 7.5
(15,696) (IS.i}
Dec. 92,262 23.790 23.8 U60 4.7
(16.431) (17.8)
1!l·B - June 101.276 23,797 23.5 4.466 4.4
(18,694) (18.5)
Source: Member Bank Call Reports.
- Figures in parentheses include certificates of indebtedness.
liquid as cash. The shift from cash to Treasury bills and certifi-
catcs was encouraged by pressure upon bankers by Treasury and
Reserve officials to utilize excess reserves. From an operational
standpoint Treasury bills, and to some extent certificates, now per-
form much the same function as excess reser\'es.H
41 The virtual disappearance of excess reserves in the financial centers has led to
some borrowing at Reserve Banks and to a minor revival of dealings in "federal
funds" for facilitating adjustments in the liquidity position of banks. During the
twenties the lalter operations were fairly important among banks in the principal
money centers, but they practically ceased as a result of the emergence of large ex~
resenies. For details see B. H. Beckhart and J. G. Smith, The Nell! York MOIIC)' Market,
Vol. 2 (New York, 1933) pp. 40-48; and Bernice C. Turner, The Federal Funds
Markel (New York, 1931).
58The growth in holdings of Treasury bills and certificates has
largely compensated for the failure of cash assets to keep pace with
the growth in deposits. When allowance is made for the expansion
in bank holdings of other Treasury obligations, which at present
are hardly less liquid than certificates ofindebtedness, itseems clear
that bank assets as a whole have become increasingly liquid since
1941.
Further evidence pointing in the same direction is obtainable
from reports of the FDIC, showing the percentage of total assets of
all insured commercial banks which were listed as substandard in
quality. As may be seen from Table 12. a marked decline in the
proportion of substandard assets occurred after 1939. While the
improvement was substantial in all size classes it was somewhat
greater for very large banks than for smaller banks from 1939 to
1942. and slightly less in 1943. In general, there is an inverse cor-
relation between size of bank and proportion of substandard assets.
For all classes of banks, also, there was a decline in the ratio of
substandard assets to capital accounts.
The decline in the proportion of substandard assets reflects steps
TABLE 12-RATIO OF SUBSTANDARD AssETS TO TOTAL ASSETS OF
INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS. 1939-43-
(dollar figures in thousands)
Banlts With 1939 1910 1941 1942 1913
Depositsof
$100orless 11.560/0 8.900/0 7.69<10 5.79% I 2.57%
100·250 8.81 6.95 5.4lJ 4.21 I
250 ·500 7.46 5.88 45lJ lU8 1.95
500·1.000 7.21 5.B5 4.48 lJ.l3 1.77
1,000 - 2.000 755 6.04 4.67 lJ.~ 1.87
2,000·5.000 7.lJ5 6.lJl 4.7lJ lJ51 1.92
5,000- 10,000 6.6lJ 557 4.27 lJ.lJO 1.86
10.000 - 50.000 5.69 4.42 lJ.M 256 1.49
More than 50.000 3.84 2.86 1.99 154 .94
ALL BANKS 5.100/0 lJ.92'1o 2.8lJ% 2.13% 1.240/0
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Annual Reports.
_Total assets and substandard assets for all banks were as follows (in billions of
dollan) :
1939 1940 1941 1912 1913
Total $58.25 $65.18 $71.70 $80.45 $102.02
Substandard 2!11 2.55 2.0lJ 1.71 1.26
59taken to get rid of inferior assets and to supervise credit extension
more carefully. The absoilltr amount of substandard assets fell
from nearly three billion dollars in 1939 to a billion and a quarter
four years later. The elIett of the disproportionate innease ill hank
holdings of Tl-easury securities, which arc never shown as substan-
dard, was to improve the average shoWing of the entire portfolio.
The liquidity of bank assets is ordinariiy assumed to he im'erse
TABLE ]3-AvERAGE MATURITY OF ASSETS OF INSURED























8 As,c[s classified by maluritl" with dollar I"alllcs multiplied hy mid~p()illt hC1WCl'Il ilia'
turil)" exlremes, malurily dislrihll!ion for all inveslmeuls al"ailahle J)ecembel- 1938 10
Jllue 1942: subsequenlly ollly gOl"ernmelll obligalions are lisled. The proportion of
lerlll loans 10 commercial and induslrial loans following 1940 has heen ;Issumcd [ll be
the snne as of lhal year: olher loalls and miscellaneous aSSCls less lhan one \ear
ma!JIrill", ..h'\ClS, Federal Deposil Insurance Corporaliou. Rrports; lime wei~hls for
lerm loans, Neil H. ja<oby and R. J. Saulnier. Term Lel/r/il/I{ to BlIsil/e.1.I l:'iarional
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942) p. 139: for real
("1;111' loam. Federal HOllsin~ :\t1minislralioll, Rep,,'t~\.
to their maturity. On the basis of generalized assumptions concern-
ing securities in particular categories, it appears that the a\'erage
time to maturity of all earning assets of insured banks declined
irregularly from 50.8 months in June 1939 to 41.8 months in June
]944 (see Table 13). Since the portfolios of commercial banks are
increasingly dominated by Treasury obligations, the distribution
by maturity of United States government securities held by banks
is of particular impertance to the over-all question of maturity of
assets.
Changes in the matnrity distrihution of Treasury ohligations
held hy member banks during the period from June 19~9 to .June
1944 are shown in Table 14. At the stan ronghly similar amonnts
were held in the three categorif's of Treasnry obligations of 1 to 5,
5 to 10 and 10 to 20 years' maturity. Smaller amonnts were held
60in securities maturing in less than 1 and in more than 20 years.
For a time after the outbreak of war in Europe there was an increas-
ing concentration in securities matming in from 10 to 20 years.
From the end of 1941 on there was a steady decline in the propor-
tion of assets maturing in more than 10 years and a rise in the pro-
portion of each category of securities matming in les.~ than 10 years.
In part this was a reflection of the l'estrictions placed upon banks'
acquiring longer-term Treasury securities. The effect was to de-
crease materially the proportion of long-term Treasury obligations
held by banks, both relative to total bank holdings and relative to
total Treasury issues of these types.
TABLE 14-PROPORTION OF 'TREASURY OBLIGATIONS IN DIFFEREl\T
MATURITY CLASSIFICATIONS HELD BY MEMBER BANKS,
JUNE 1939 TO JUNE 1944
End of
Wit/lin 1·5 5·10 10·20 Over 20
1 Year Years }'ears rears }·ear.!
1939-June 4.0% 32.0% 25.8% 26.4% 11.8%
1>«. 5.0 26.8 27.0 32.7 8.5
194{) - June 6.9 27.8 27.6 32.5 5.2
Dec. 5.3 32.1 2!l.4 35.2 4.0
1941-June 7.9 28.2 24.8 35.6 3.5
1>«. 6.2 28.4 23.3 34.7 7.4
J942- June 15.8 24.9 23.1 30.9 5.2
Dec. 30.4 23.5 25.9 16.9 3.2
1943-June 35.3 23.5 22.3 16.1 2.8
Dec. 32.5 24.4 29.5 11.0 2.7
1944-June 31.4 27.1 30.0 9.0 2.5
Source: Member Bank Call Reports.
In June 1939 over 38 percent of Treasury obligations held by
banks had a maturity of 10 years or more. At the end of 1941 over
42 percent were in this group, while by the middle of 1944 the
proportion had fallen to 11.5 percent. On the other hand, holdings
of Treasury securities maturing in one year or less rose from 4
percent in June 1939 and 6 percent in December 1941 to over 31
percent in June 1944. These shifts constitute the outstanding
feature of the strengthened liquidity position of banks.
61FEDERAL RESERVE TECHNIQUES FOR PROVIDI:O\G
BANKING LIQUIDITY
A central bank has the power to furnish liquidity by creating addi.
tional reserves. It is a delIS ex machina that may provide liquidity
after internal resources have ceased to be adequate for the demands
made upon them. As long as the central bank is able and willing
to furnish cash, either on its own initiative or when called upon
by the commercial banks, there can be little question of lack of
liquidity for individual banks or for the banking system. The con-
dition of the individual bank may be highly important, however,
in influencing the willingness of the central bank to lend. The
extent of the assistance afforded by central banks may at times be
very large. In 1919 and 1920, for example, the amount of member
bank borrowing from Federal Reserve Banks exceeded the total of
member bank reserves, so that, in effect, member banks were operat-
ing on borrowed reserves. Inasmuch as borrowing from the Fed-
eral Reserve was the principal means employed during and after
the last war to enable banks to obtain additional liquid funds,~;! it
is all the more remarkable that it has scarcely figured in the finan-
cial operations of the second World War.
Since the early twenties there has grown up a strong tradition
against borrowing by member banks. In part, this tradition may
have been a reaction from the excessive reliance upon borrowing
at that time.43 At any rate, it became one of the bases of Federal
42 See Anna Youngman, Tile Federal Reserve S'ystem in Wartime (~alional Bureau
of Economic Research. Financial Research Program, 1945) pp. 211·30.
43 The prejudice againsl borrowing was probably influenced by lhe experience of
banks which found lhemselves pinched by lhe raising of di~llnl rales in 1920 and
again in 1929 al limes when lhey were heaVily in debl al lhe Reserve Banks. More·
over. lhere was a high correlalion belween borrowing by banks from 1918 10 1952 and
bauk failures from 193010 1935 (see especially Fred L. Garlock and B. M. Gile. "Bank
Failures in Arkansas," Bullelin 315, Agricullural Experimem Stalion, Universily of
Arkansas. March 1955). While lhe borrowing lhal occurred in lhis period may have
been more lhe mull lhan the ause of lhe weakness of banks. lhe conneclion was 100
apparem 10 be missed. The opposition lO colllinuous borrowing is funher supporled
by lhe consideralion, grounded in bolh logic and experience, lhal the practice of
borrowing in good limes may make il more difficull for a bank 10 borrow in an
emergency. This is because of lhe unfavomble impression likely 10 be crealed by
COOlinuous borrowing and because lhe pledging of assets will have reduced lhe amoum
of collaleral a\'ailable for use in an emergency. The hoslilily of deposilors 10 heavy
bank borrowing may be based upon lhe lhoughl lhat a bank lhal borrows from olher
banks or the cemral bank ordinarily pledges assets of the highesl qualJlY. lhereoy
lowering 10 lhal eXleOl lhe average qualily of lhe assets prolecling lhe claims of
deposilors.
62Reserve operations. It operated to hasten an automatic contraction
of credit when conditions made it possible for banks to repay their
loans, and it helped to discourage banks from continuous reliance
upon the Reserve Banks. As the tradition grew stronger, it became
an obstruction not only to unwarranted borrowing but also to that
type of emergency borrowing which a central bank is expected to
facilitate. It hindered the Reserve Banks in discharging the func-
tion of a lender of last resort, and consequently interfered with the
automatic provision of liquidity through the Federal Reserve.
This fact was of little immediate importance as lon~ as excess
reserves were so large as to relieve banks of a general need for addi-
tional liquid funds. But by the middle of 1942 Treasury borrow-
ing had begun on a large scale and it was apparent that steps must
be taken to furnish Reserve Bank credit. The principal methods
adopted were open market operations of the traditional type and
Treasury bill purchases.44 The latter will be dealt with at length,
since it is the newest, the least known, and currently the most
important instrument of Federal Reserve policy.
1. Open Markel Operations
Open market operations have played a major part in the mainte-
nance of bank liquidity since 1939. It is to be observed, however,
that this particular instrument of Federal Reserve policy has gone
through an especially lengthy process of evolution,which has greatly
altered its character. Originally purchases were made in the open
market to obtain earning assets for the Reserve Banks.45 In their
second and most familiar stage, open market operations were used
to influence the volume of member bank reserves for the purpose
of controlling credit.
The third phase began in 1937 when purchases were made to
preserve "orderly conditions" in the security market. In comment·
ing on the use of these measures at the outbreak of war in 1939,
U Legal re5en'e reqUirements were lowered for cennal reserve dty banks in 1942.
but since there had been a ~neral increase in 1941 the net connibution of this
device to the liquidity of the banking system has been slight. See Youngman. of'. cit.,
pp. 24·28: and C. R. Whinle5ey, "Reserve Requiremen15 and the Integration of Credit
Policies;' Quarterl}' Journal 01 Economics (August 1944). pp. 553-70.
45 Open market purchases were also employed to broaden the market for certain
types of securities, such as bankers' bills and United States certificates of indebtedness.
See Federal Re5eJVe Bank of 805ton, Annual Report, 1921, p. 15.
63the Reserve authotitics mentloned two rnajor considerations under-
lying their action. The finst was the desire to exert a steadying
influence on tlte entire (:apilaJ markel. and the set:ond was a feeling
that the federal Reserve System "h;i~ a mea.'iure of responsibility
for s4lfcguardin~ llie lar~e Vnit(·<\ States (;{J\"Crnmcnt portfolio oi
the member hanks from unncu:ssarily wide and violent fluctuations
in price." 411
At that same time the Hoard of GO\'crnoTS declared that "the
System has neither the obligfltion nm' the jlower to assure any given
level of prices or yields for Government secllrities." 4i It is an indi-
cation of the rapidity of the changes effected by war that two years
after this declaration was published the Resen'e authorities discO\"
ered that the Federal Reserve System had hoth the power and the
obligation to establish a fixed pattern of yields on gm"emmem
securities. The date of the announcement of this policy. 'lay 1942,
marks thestart of the founh phase of open market operations. theil'
use to maintain a fixed pattern of interest rates on Treasury obliga-
tions. While the second and third phases ha\"e been ofsome impor.
tance since the start of the present war, their origin antedated the
war. The fourth phase is entirely the product of the war. and one
that has constituted a central feature of the Treasury's policy of
war financing.
48
Open market purchases. whate\'er their immediate objectives.
have affected the liquidity of the banking s~stem in a variety of
ways. They have put funds into the market and thereby strength-
ened the banks' cash position, and they were used to quiet the state
of alarm caused by the outbreak of war in Europe, and later in the
Pacific. To the extent that this action helped to prevent security
prices from declining more than thev did. it contributed to increas-
46 Board of GOIoernors of the federal Resenoe Sntem. Annual Report. 1939, p. 5.
While the qualifring phrase "unne£essaril~ "ide and \lolent" m:u perhaps be
regarded as constituting a significant resen'ation, this declaration pro,"ides a possible
precedent for future Federal Resen"e policy. It ma\' be construed as suggesting that
as long as g'lwemment securities occup~ a major place in member bank portfolios the
Resen"e Banks will feel constrained to promote stability in their market \·alue. a
position that was made still more explicit in the Atmua/ Rtport for 1~3. p. 29.
47 Ibid.• p. 5. Italics not in the original.
tl!The Federal Resene Banks' Treasun bill polioo. though oflen dassifiro as one
phase of open ~ar"et operations. is treated separately in thi~ paper. It is to be noted.
ho,,·e\'er. that II pla~ed an important role in anchoring the pallem of niles at the
lo"oer extremity. Youngman. of>. cit., pp. 22-24.
64ing the liquidity of banks owning securities whose prices were
supported.
The use of open market operations has been of great importance
in preserving a stable pattern of imerest rates. By this policy the
Federal Reserve has rendered Treasury obligations as liquid as
cash. As long as the policy is in force, there can hardly be any
question, in view of the large amoum of such securities held by
banks, as to the adequacy of liquid banking assets. For the time
being liquidity is assured for the entire system of commercial banks,
and presumably for any bank that holds its proportionate share of
government securities. A further effect is to render differences in
maturity of no immediate significance to the liquidity of govern-
ment obligations: as long as it is the policy of the Reserve Banks to
preserve the established pattern of rates on marketable government
securities, the liquidity ofall of them is apparemly the same. While
this policy continues, banks are able to obtain the higher yields
a\!ailable on longer maturities without sacrificing liquidity.4' This
consideration is important for smalIer banks whose earnings have
been depressed and particularly for banks in the interior which feel
that they are likely to be subject to a contraction of deposits and a
drain of reserves when the war boom begins to subside.5O
The possibility that the Reserve Bank policy of stabilizing the
market for governmem securities will be cominued is of the utmost
importance to the problem of bank liquidity. The disadvantage
of announcing permanent stabilization of the market for g-overn-
mem securities is apparent: guaranteeing the liquidity of lon~er·
term securities would tend to aggravate the already troublesome
problem of maintaining the presem differential in yield on longer
and shorter maturities. The maintenance of a gin'n schedule of
imerest rates on Treasury obligations inevitably results in a para-
doxical situation. It makes alI of the securities fulIy liquid; but
when the securities become equally liquid the schedule of "rates
ceases to be self-sustaining, and consequently the difficult)" of main-
49 The future of the policy may be decided as much by the Treasury as by the
Federal Resene. Secretary' Morgenthau has indicated a determination to presen"e
the existing pattern of rates, Cf. Trcasul)" Department, Press Release. October 14. 19-14.
51) The reluctance of certain \'el)' large banks to rel\" on sales in the market for
liquidity. lest the scdle of operations depress the price of the securities offered.
il1\"OI\'e5 the tacit assumption that the Federal Reserve either would not be in a
position. or would not be Willing. to continue to support the market (or government
securities.
65t~mmg it is greatly accentuated. Only as long as there is some
doubt concerning the future liquidity of longer-term securities,
because of the possibility that the Reserve authorities will abandon
its policy, is there an economic basis for differences in rates.
2. Treasury Bill Policy
Since the start of defense financing, the most distinctive feature of
Federal Reserve credit policy, and the chief means of providing
additional funds, has been the purchase and sale of Treasury bills
at a fixed rate of discount. The introduction of the technique of a
fixed buying and selling rate on bill~to facilitate the adjustment of
the volume of member bank reserves provided virtually a new
instrument of Federal Reserve policy. This instrument has char-
acteristics of both discount policy and open market operations as
customarily carried on. It originated because it succeeded in over-
coming the defects of other methods of regulating the volume of
available Reserve Bank credit. The role of Treasury bills is some-
what similar to that performed by bankers' bills during and after
the last war.51
Toward the end of April 1942, at the time the Treasury an-
nounced its plans for the start of heavy war financing, the Open
Market Committee of the Federal Reserve established a fixed buy·
ing rate on Treasury bills of %percent pe~ annum. The declared
purposes in initiating this policy were to stabilize the bill market,
effect a broader distribution of bills and facilit'ate prompt adjust-
ment of bank reserves to changing conditions.52 Although the
volume of excess reserves held in the larger centers had declined
sharply during the preceding year, they were still large in most
other areas. The establishment of a fixed buying rate on Treasury
bills was intended to assure banks that they could purchase bills
51 During the first World War and in the 1920's, the Federal Reserve Banks stood
ready at all times to purchase bankers' bills at the official discount rate. Member
banks and dealers made frequent use of the privilege, dealers sometimes selling bills
under "repurchase contracts" whereby they bound themselves to buy the bills back
within fifteen days. The preferred status given bankers' bills was partly designed to
facilitate the WIder adoption of this financial instrument. At the same time it helped
to provide a means whereby additional Federal Reserve credit could be obtained, in
time of temporary strain and returned when the emergency was past. See W. Ran-
dolph Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market, Revised Edition (New
York, 1936) Chapter X, esp. pp. 171-78.
52 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1942, p. 14.
66with their excess funds and still be in a position, without risk of
loss, to obtain I"eSerVes or currency whenever necessary. The pri-
mary objective seems to have been to encourage bank.s, particularly
bank.s outside central reserve cities, to reduLc eXLess reserves.!\3 The
following August the Open Market Committee directed the Reserve
Banks to afford sellers of bills the option of repurchasing a like
amount of bills of the same maturity at the established rate.1It Orig-
inally transactions were for delivery, except in case of emergency,
on the following full business day. This was modified so that
securities were delivered immediately upon completion of a sale.55
The net result of these various provisions was to render Treasury
bills absolutely liquid. They became practically equivalent to
excess reserves and were so called and so treated by many bankers,
even though legally they were not reserves at all.
The introduction of this technique for providing liquid funds
was partly attributable to the circumstances that prevailed at the
time. The banks had held excess reserves for nearly a decade and
gradually had come to regard a substantial, though usually unspeci-
fied, amount of excess reserves as normal and desirable. The Fed-
eral Reserve authorities concluded that a reduction in the amount
of excess reserves was called for on the grounds, first, that they con·
stituted idle funds which should be at work in the interest of the
war effort, and second, that the future control of credit would be
facilitated by their absorption. The principal reason for establish-
ing a fixed buying rate on bills, however, was that the expansion
of deposits and currency and the shifting of balances from area to
area made it necessary that reserve funds should be readily avail-
able. This necessity was bound to arise whether or not existing
reserves were fully utilized. The adoption of the Treasury bill
53 Ibid., and Federal Resen'e Bulletin (july 1942) p. 631.
6.The same prh"ilege with respect both to the purchase of hills and the repurchase
option was accorded individuals. corporations and others. See Board of Governors of
the Federal Resen"e Slstem. Annual Report, 1942. ,,'hile the changes introduced re-
sulted in a somewhat wider distribution of TreasuT\" bills. the hea'"iesl purchasers con-
tinued to be the large mone}".market banks. Bl the middle of 1943 excess re:sen"es
had been greatly reduced in reserve city banks but remained substantial in country
banks. In an effort to enwurage larger purchases of Treasuf"}" bills b}" (Ountry banks
a policy was inaugurated in May 1943 allotting in full. at a price to }"ield % percent.
all sUbsaiptions to Treasury bills amounting 10 not more than 5100.000. later raised
to $200.000. See Federal Resen~ Bulletin (june 1943) p. 492. Details relating to the
purc:hase of Treasuf"}' bills are given in the Federal Relen-I: Blliletin (jUly 1942)
pp.631-52-
55Board of Go'"emors of the Federal Resen"e S}"stem. AI/nual Report. 1942, p. 108.
67mechanism as the principal means of putting reserves into the mar-
ket may be traced, briefly, to the fact that it served to accomplish
four corollary results:
a. It made possible the absorption of the great hulk. ot
excess reserves;
b. At the same time it left banks as liquid as they would
have been with an equivalent amount ofexcess resenes;
c. By furnishing reserves in the amounts and places needed
it helped to make up for the lack of precision and au-
tomatism of usual open market operations; and
d. It provided an instrument more simple and automatic
than discountingat a time when that instrument was se-
verely handicapped by the tradition against borrowing.
a. Mechanical Provisions
While Treasury bills are obtainable at any time through ordinary
trading in the market, the bulk of them are purchased through
direct bids publicly solicited by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Offerings of bills, generally of three months' maturity, are made
each week. Tenders are received by the Reserve Banks or their
branches acting for the Treasury, and the bills are issued in denomi-
nations with a maturity value of $1,000, $5,000, $10,000, $100,000.
$500,000 and $1,000,000. The price bid is the par value less an
amount equal to discount to maturity at the rate the bidder is
willing to accept. Ordinarily payment is in immediately available
funds, but occasionally payment is by credits to war loan deposit
accounts. Except for the allotment of $200,000:16 to any bidder at
a fixed price equivalent to a yield of approximately % percent,
awards are granted on the basis of the highest bid. A bidder may
submit tenders at more than one price, but a separate tender is
required at each price.57
In order to permit immediate delivery of securities reacquired
under the repurchase option, it became necessary to deal with them
separately. Instead of keeping them in the "System account." as
is the case with bills purchased outright and with securities pur-
56 Prior to ~o\"ember 30. 1944. rhe amount that might he allotted in Ihis \Va,
lcas $100.000.
67 Treasun' Depanmenl Circular ;'\10. 418 as amended, and Federal Reserve Bulletin
(july )942) pp. 631·32.
68CHART 8--TuASURY BILLS, WEEKLY ISSUES AND TOTALS OUTSTANDING.















69chased through ordinary open market operations, Treasury bills
subject to the repurchaseoption are held in the Bank's own account
by the individual Reserve Bank making the purchase.
li
;; Where a
member bank lea\'(~s Trea.~lIry bills "l:ith a Federal Rese~\'{: nank
for safekeeping. a Hausfer from Treasury bills to the reserve
account, or vice versa, involves little more than notifying the Bank
of the member bank·s desire to make the shift.
b. Transactions in Treasury Bills, Volume and Yield
Prior to the establishment of the posted bill rate, the weekly issues
of Treasurv bills had fluctuated between $100 and $200 million
I
(see Chan 8). With the inauguration of the new policy the weekly
issue was raised from $150 to $250 million. In the course of the
following year the amount issued each week was increased to
approximately $900 million and by June 1943 to approximately
$1 billion. It remained at this figure until May 1944 when it was
increased to $1.2 billion, and continued at that level to the end of
the year with the exception of a seven week period in October and
November when weekly issues amounted to $1.3 billion.
The total volume of bill!i outstanding was around $2 billion at
the stan of the posted bill policy, and rose gradually from that
point to a little over $13 billion in September 1943. The increase
initiated in May 1944 raised the total to over $16 billion in
December.
Throughout most of the year preceding the establishment of the
fixed buying rate, the average rate of yield on Treasury bills had
been below I.4 percent, much of the time well below. With the
authorization of a Ml percent rate, the average yield at which Treas-
ury bills were sold rose toward this level. At one time a consider.
able proportion of the bilis issued were bought at a price to yield
somewhat less than % percent, but the amount of the premium
and the proportion of the total issue sold at a premium subse-
quently decreased and from the middle of 1943 onward the average
yield confonned closely to the official rate.
Holdings of Treasury bills by commercial banks and by the Fed·
eral Reserve Banks have undergone pronounced changes in both
absolute and relative amounts (see Table 15 and Chart 9). At the
58 Board of GO\ernors of the Federal ReseTVe S}'stem. Annual Report, 1942, p. 108.
70TABLE 15-BANK HOLDINGS OF TI\EA'lURY BILLS,
jANI,;ARY 1942 TO NOVEMBER 1944
(dollarfigures inmillions)
Federal ReselW Ballks Commercial Banksa
End oj Doliar %ofTOlal Bills Dollar % of TotalBills





April $91 4.i% 1.191 61.0
May 156 6.9 1,M0 59.8
June 214 9.7 1,557 62.1
July 566 155 2.265 61.8
August 696 16.7 2.648 655
September 657 14.2 2.884 62.4
October 481 9.4 !I.468 67.7
November 5~5 6.7 4.216 73.7
December 1.010 15.2 4.497 67.9
19n
January 689 9.5 5.568 75.0
February 1.475 17.9 5.302 64.4
March 2.087 22.6 5.069 54.9
April 2.-130 24.2 6.415 65.9
May 2.442 22.5 7.017 64.7
June 5.R15 52.2 6.502 54.8
JUly 4.896 59.3 5.959 47.7
August 5.701 44.4 5.255 40.7
September 5.551 41.0 6,448 49.4
October 5,547 42.5 6.227 47.7
No\-ember 6.165 47.1 5,645 45.2
December 6.768 51.8 4.716 56.1
1944
January 6.941 55.0 4.904 37.4
February 6j54 485 5.484 41.8
March 6,552 49.7 4,606 55.0
April 7,641 5iU 4.157 315
l\fay 8.466 61.5 5.627 26.5
June 8,872 60.2 4,894 55.2
July 9.065 58.2 5.477 55.2
August 10.074 &t.0 4,554 29.0
September 10.785 68.2 5.615 25.0
October 11,551 71.9 5.091 19.2
November 11.868 72.5 2.955 17.9
Source: Treasury Bulletin and Federal Reun'e Bulle/in.
aSelected banks (O\'ered by Treasury Department ~urvey. numbering under 6.000 at




































CHART 9-DISTRIBUTION OF TREASURY BILL HOLDINGS,
APRIL 1942 - NOVEMBER 1944
end of April 1942, i.e., just before the posted bill policy became
effective, commercial banks held 61 percellt of the total amount
outstanding and the Federal Reserve Banks held under 5 percent.
With the expansion in the amount of bills currently being issued,
butb commercial banks and Reserve Banks increased their holdings.
In May 1943, the volume of Treasury bills held by commercial
banks reached a peak of $7,017 million. At that time 65 percent
out of a total of $10,853 million of Treasury bills outstanding were
lodged in commercial banks. On the same date the twelve FederalReserve Banks. with $1,531 million on repurchase option and $911
million owned outright, held 22 percent of the total.
Beginning in June 1943, and again toward the end of the year,
Treasury bills poured into the Federal Reserve Banks. Until May
1943 the Tu~asury bill account of the Federal Reserve could claim
to be primarily a device for adjusting variations in the cash require-
ments of member banks. From then on, although there were
movements in and out, the account was no longer principally
an adjusting mechanism. The primary reason for the growth of
the account was the need for additional Reserve Bank credit fol.
lowing heavy demands for liquid funds by member banks and the
public generally. The fact that the need expressed itself so largely
in the acquisition of Treasury bills by the Reserve Banks was partly
a reflection, apparently, of the saturation of demand for Treasury
bills on the part of banks and of a desire to shift to other securities
carrying a higher yield. This desire showed itself both in the sale
to the Reserve Banks of bills originally acquired by banks and in
the necessity of the Reserve Banks absorbing a larger proportion of
new issues by taking them off the hands of dealers without their
ever reaching the vaults of commercial banks.
The fact that a considerable volume of Treasury bill holdings
was being shifted from commercial banks to the Federal Resenre
did not mean that Treasury bills had ceased to act as a cushioning
device. There was still a substantial movement in and out of the
account, and commercial banks made use of bills to obtain addi-
tional reserves when necessary, or to invest cash when temporarily
in excess of needs. From the litart of the Treasury bill policy,
Federal Reserve holdings of bills fell essentially into two parts-
those that served primarily as a cushion, and those held as the result
of a more or less pennanent addition to the supply of reserves in
the market. ·With the passage of time, the second category became
of increasingly greater importance.
In general, the Treasury bills held by the Resenre Banks on
repurchase option have constituted a high proportion of the total
though the share declined greatly in 1944 (Table 16). The maxi·
mum amount held on this basis was reached in October 1944, with
a total of $5,012 million. It is customary to grant the repurchase
option more or less automatically when banks take the initiative
in selling bills. The actual volume of bills held under option is
73---~
TABLE 16-TREASlIRY BILLS HELD BY FEDERAL RF.5nVE
BANKS SUBJECf TO REPURCHASE OmON,































































































not of great significance, since it does not necessarily reflect an
expectation to repurchase. Once a given volume of Reserve credit
is built up it becomes necessary for the Reserve Banks, in order to
avoid a contraction, to replace bills and other Treasury securi-
ties as they mature. Replacement is ordinarily effected by buying
74Treasury bills, and inasmuch as bills acquired in this manner are
not held under the option to repurchase, the result is a declining
ratio of option bills to the total.
The principal need of commercial banks for additional liquid
funds was to meet the demand for currency in circulation and to
satisfy the rise ill reserve requirements resulting from the growth
in deposits. After April 1943 banks were no longer required to
hold reserves against Treasury deposits based on newly issued secu-
rities purchased from the Treasury. Consequently, the transfer of
large sums from private accounts to the government during war
loan drives served to release reserves. Thesereserves were required
again, as disbursments from government balances gradually trans-
ferred deposits back. to private ownership.
This factor was largely responsible, during the Third War Loan
Drive, for a reduction in member bank reserve requirements of
$1,707 million between September 8 and October 6, 1943. In the
Fourt.h War Loan Drive reserve requirements fell by $947 million
between January 26 and February 23, 1944, in the Fifth by $1,373
million between June 14 and July 12, 1944, and in the Sixth by
$976 million between November 22 and December 20, 1944. In-
stead of excess reserves rising by an equal amount, they increased
by only $54 million in February, by $504 million in July and by
$215 million in December; the difference resulted largely from the
use of free reserves to purchase Treasury bills.59 The pronounced
short-run fluctuations in the amount of required reserves rendered
the introouction of the Treasury bill policy doubly important and
timely, because it facilitated adjustments to temporary changes in
liquidity requirements.
c. The Role of the Dealer
In genera! a smaller proportion of the amount of Treasury bills
applied for :n each district is allocated in New York. than in any of
the other dist.-icts (see Table 17). However, the proportion of the
total taken in the New York. District has shown a tendency to
increase. Both tl'ese features of the distribution of Treasury bills
59 Abo see Table 15. Holdings of Treasury bills by investon other than financial
ill5titutiol\S and United States government agencies tended to increase prior to war
loan drives and then to decre:l5e (Treml'" Bullelin) •
75TABLE 17-TREASURY BILL TENDERS AND ALLOCATIONS BY
FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICfS, DECEMBER 1942 AND
DECEMBER 1944
(doHar figures in thousands)
-->~--






Amount ofTota) Amount ofTotal --_ ..
&ston $32,265 $21,043 !l.50% $39,775 $26,495 2.20%
New York 789,657 319,978 511.27 1,333,298 823,778 68.53
Philadelphia 35,906 20,187 3.!16 51,905 35,385 2.94
Cle\'e1and !IS,650 20,092 3.34 29,265 28,005 2.33
Richmond 21,767 12,466 2.08 13,268 12,468 u»
Atlanta 10,692 5,958 .99 12,570 12.330 1.03
Chicago 155,687 105,401 17.55 282,950 180,750 15.04
St. Louis 2UH2 12.362 2.06 20,120 13.920 1.16
Minneapolis 16.862 15,389 2.56 8.990 6.580 .55
Kansas City 12.268 10,464 1.74 14,111 11,711 .97
Dallas 10.990 9,485 1.58 9,615 9,615 .80
San Francisco 77.620 47.884 7.97 52,165 40.965 3.41
Au. RES£RVF.
BANKS $1.220,406 $600.709 IOOJlO% $1,868,032 $1,202.062 100.00%
Source: Treasury Deparlment, Press Releases, December 22, 19·12 and December 23,
1944.
are a reflection of the important role played by dealers in govern-
ment securities.
It has been customary for dealers, and som~ leading banks, to
present large bids at the weekly offerings of Treasury bills.60 The
amounts applied for under current conditions do not represent
what dealers expect to be able to pass on to their regular customers.
Their bids serve the useful purpose, however, of helping to assure
that the entire issue will be taken. In substance, the dealers in
government securities underwrite, to the extent of their bids, each
issue of Treasury bills. They, in tum, resell to the Federal Reserve
at the official rate the bills they have been unable to distribute.61
The bills thus turned back to the Federal Reserve by the dealers
60 The bids are usually entered at 99.905, since these three decimal places correspond
nearest to a yield of % percenl. However, the price varies slightly according to
whether the period is for 91 or 92 da)·s.
61 During the period under review the secolltlary distribution to dealers· customers







1are sold as of the issue date. and all the interest income accrues to
the Reserve Banks. Purchases from dealers enable the Reserve
Banks to replace maturing Treasury obligations and thus offset any
tem!ency for the volume of Reserve credit to contract.
The volume of sales to dealers is not published. In effect the
amount dealers take is determined by the demand from other pur-
chasers. Since the larger dealers in government securities are located
in New York. a substantial increase in the proportion of sales in
New York may indicate an increase in the amount of bills absorbed
by dealers.62 Such an indication is further strengthened if. at the
same time. the share sold at the low rate rises or the average moves
up toward the %percent yield. The combination of these various
factors points to an increased reliance upon sales to dealers after the
middle of 1943. The decline in allotments in New York at certain
dates. particularly during war loan drives. when hanks are in a
position to expand their purchases of Treasury hills is further evi-
dence of the residual position occupied by the dealers.
d. Treasury Bill Policy as an Adjusting Mechanism
The introl.uction of the Treasury bill policy provided an effective
h~~·:h~~lism for enabling the Federal Reserve Banks to put addi-
tional funds into the market. Inasmuch as the initiative in effect-
ingchanges in the volume of cash rests with the individual member
banks. the flow of cash is more or less automatically adjusted with
respect to amount. place and time. Moreover. the mechanism facil-
itates. although it does not assure. the automatic contraction of
reserve balances whenever and wherever they become excessive.
The purchase and sale ofTreasury bills pennits more precise adjust-
ments than ordinary open market operations. just as these permit
finer adjustments than are possible by means of changes in reserve
requirements. In short. it is most sensitive to changes in the
liquidity needs of banks.
The Treasury bill technique has the further advantage that it
does not necessitate any administrative decisions on the part of the
62 This e\·idence. however, is far from conclusive. If purchases by banks and other
hu)'crs in ~ew York were to decline, the proportion taken by dealers might increase
without any change appearing in the total absorption of bills by the District as a
whole.
, 77authorities. whose role is purely passive. As regards the initiative
resting with the hanks and the automatic adjustment to varying
requirements of particular banks it resembles discount and bankers'
atceptance operations.o3 At the time of its introduction, the great
advantage of Treasury bill policy over discount policy in meeting
the liquidity requirements arising out of the war was that it had
no popular prejudice with which to contend. Its superiority lay
not so much in its technical provisions as in the manner in which
it circumvented the tradition against borrowing.
Treasury bills have provided an effective means of adjusting the
cash position of banks. But this is only one of the ends served by
Treasury bills, and in the course of time certificates and other
Treasury obligations of still longer maturity have also come to per-
form something of the function of an adjusting medium. In terms
of its ideal functioning as a regulator of the quantity of member
bank reseJves, it might have been expected that changes in the
volume of Treasury bills offered for sale to the Reserve Banks
would reflect changes in the banks' needs for currency and reserves.
Thus a sustained increase in Federal Reserve holdings of bills might
have been taken to indicate an overissue, and to guide the Treasury
in cutting down on future offerings. No such automatic operation
has been realized. During part of the time increased offerings of
bills at the Federal Reserve Banks reflected not so much a change
in the credit needs oE member banks as their desire to substitute
higher-yield securities for the low-yield Treasury bills.
e. Relation to Treasury Firumcitlg
By the middle of 1943 the magnitude of Federal Reserve holdings
of Treasury bills exceeded the proportions of what could reason-
ably be regarded as an adjustment fund. From that time on Treas-
ury bills were primarily the means relied upon by the Reserve
Banks to maintain an adequate volume of liquid funds in the
market. In fulfilling this purpose, they had the further effect of
enabling the Treasury to borrow fmm the Reserve Banks at a low
rate of interest. The purchase of Treasury hills constituted a form
e3 In the fase of di5Couluing, the authorilies arc tCfhnically not clIlireh' passive
since the)' mllst pass upon the quality o( the paper presented; not C\'cn this is 'necessary
in the case o( the purchase of Treasury bills.
78of borrowing from the Reserve Banks that was less likely to
provoke criticism than borrowing directly or by means of other
securities.
Instead of increasin~ Treasury borrowing from the Federal
Reserve Banks this policy may actually have had the opposite
effect. The amount of securities absorbed by the ReserH Banks
was determined primarily by the requirements of member banks
for additional reserves.. To the ('xtent that the Treasury bill policy
led to the utilization of excess reserves that would otherwise have
remained idle, its elIect was to restrict the creation of new Reserve
Bank credit and therefore the total purchases of Treasury obliga-
tions by the Reserve Banks.
In the absence of the acti"ation of excess reserves. it would have
been necessary for the Reserve Banks to provide that much more
credit by other means.64 The payment of interest on what were in
effect the excess reserves of member banks did not necessarily repre-
sent any additional cost to the Treasury, even though it increased
the earnings of commercial banks. Assuming the same rate of
interest on the securities that would have been acquired by the
Reserve Banks as on the Treasury bills actually held by the member
banks in lieu of excess reserves, the cost to the Treasury would be
the same under either method of financing. The chief difference
is that if a correspondingly larger volume of reserves had been
created, the Treasury would have been paying interest to the
Reserve Banks instead of to member banks.
f. Relation to Other Federal Reserve Policies
The Treasury bill policy, and panicularly the circumstances attend-
ing its introduction, provided a means of educating banks away
from their dependence upon large excess reserves to assure liquid.
ity. Under conditions prevailing in wartime the existence of excess
reserves has littledirect bearingon creditcontrol, since there is slight
occasion for the expansion of bank credit except as may be necessi-
tated by the Treasury's financing of the war, and the Reserve
64 This observation presumes that considerations of national policy call for the
creation of commerdal hank credit in whatever amounts are necessal1' to meet the
needs of the government's program of war finance. and that the Federal Resene was
under obligation to provide the resencs essential to the allainment of this end.
79authorities would hardly be disposed to prevent that sort of expan-
sion even if they could.6lS
The future level of reserves, however, will be of considerable
significance in the control of aedit by the Federal Reserve officials
after the war. Even though present policies should entirely elimi-
nate excess reserves, they might easily emerge again as a result, for
example, ofa contractionof thecurrency.6G In any case, the amount
of excess reserves will probably be less than it would have been if
the excess had not been reduced during the war.
Under ordinary circumstances the volume of excess reserves is
of considerable importance to potential changes in the circulating
medium. However, in wartime the actual increase in deposits is
governed by the needs of Treasury financing in relation to other
sources of income, rather than by the amount of member bank
reserves. Failure to utilize excess reserves merely leads to enlarged
Reserve Bank credit operations, and does not affect materially the
amount by which deposits of commercial banks are increased.
g. Relation to Member Bank Operations
The posted bill rate had the effect, in substance, of enabling banks
to earn interest on their excess reserves without undergoing the
slightest sacrifice of liquidity. As contrasted with holding an equal
amount of assets in the form of excess l'eserves, it is considerably
more profitable to put them into Treasury bills. But it is not to
be supposed that this is the only, or necessarily the most profitable,
alternative that is open to a bank. The bank also ha.~ the choice of
putting its funds into Treasury certificates yielding%percent with
the assurance that it can borrow on them at any time from its Fed-
eral Reserve Bank at a preferential rate of ~ percent. Or it can
buy Treasury bonds hearing, for example, a 2 percent return and
use them as collateral in bof!owing at the official discount rate,
now 1 percent. The use of certificates would seem to involve no
significant sacrifice of liquidity as compared with Treasury bills.
65 The Federal Reserve officials have. of course. encouraged the financing of the
war as far as possible by means other than borrowing from commercial banks.
66 As indicated elsewhere. the existence of large holdings of Treasury hills by the
Federdl Reserve Banks will facilitate absorption of excess reserves in case ther emerge
in the future. The running off of bills would eliminate reserves with much less
pressure on security prices than would result from sales of other t}'pe5 of securities









It could, however, be argued that on notes and bonds there is
greater risk, since the Federal Reserve discount rate may some day
be raised and the privilege of borrowing on government securities
TABLE IS-POSSIBLE INCOME FROM ALTERNATIVE METHODS
OF PROVIDING LIQUIDITY-
SlOlJ()OJ)(JO in the form of: ----
Excess Treasury CCnifi- 10·Year
Reserves Bills cates Bonds
Income while not in use to meet
lC:serve requirements (9 months)
Amount nil $28.125 $65,625 $150.000
Net rate perannum 0% %% %% 2%
Net income whiIe used as, or to pro-
vide, required reserves (3 months) b
Amount nil nil $9.m $25,000
Net rate perannum 0% 0% %0/. 1%
Total income for year
Amount nil $28.125 $75.000 $175.000
Average rate per annum 0% 9/320/" %~c 1%%
• A~llllllptions:
1. Bank desires to hold $10,000.000 in a form to meet fluctuations in cash require.
ments;
2. Over the period of a lear the funds will actually be in use to meet reserve re·
quirements. on the average, one·fourth of the time;
3. The posted bill policy is continued and rates of % percent and 1 percent. respec·
ti\'Cly. are maintained on borrowing from the Federal ReseT\'e on notes secured
hy government obligations under and over one year rnaturitl.
b In the case of certifk.lles and bonds. dollar amount represents illlerest receh-ed 011
security minus interest paid on advance from Reserve Bank.
at par be withdrawn. The market value of longer-term securities
is cleady subject to a greater degree of depreciation in the event of
a rise in rates of interest.
The differences in return resulting from electing each of the four
methods of providing for sudden increases in cash requirements
are indicated in Table 18. The assumption made in this compari-
son, that the cash would be required a quarter of the time, is prob-
ably unduly generous, and to that extent the calculations under-
state the gain obtainable from putting funds into certificates or
bonds in preference to buying Treasury bills. \Vhile the use of
Treasury bills is clearly more advantageous than holding excess
reserves, the gain is greater still from buying certificates or bonds.
81TABLE I9-COMMERCIAL BANK. HOLDINGS OF BILLS AND
CERTIFICATES, JULY 1942 TO NOVEMBER 1944·
(in millions)
--~------




































• Banks co\"ered b~" Trea5IJr~" Deparlmenr wn"ey.
Reliance upon either certificates or bonds in lieu of Treasury
bills to provide liquidity is discouraged, however, by the prejudice
against borrowing,61 but this obstacle was not sufficient to prevent
67 A proposal \\'~s advanced 10 eXlend the buying policy, at a suilable rale, 10
certificales for Ihe purpose in parr of mercoming Ihis obstacle.
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•a shift from bills to certificates during 1943 and 1944, as may be
seen from Table 19. At the end of November 1942 commercial
bank holdings of bills and certificates were fairly evenly balanced.
At that time the commercial banks covered in the Treasury Depart-
ment's survey held $4.2 billion of Treasury bills and $4.4 billion
of certificates. From then until the end of September 1943. both
increased, but certificates increased more rapidly than bills. On
that date the commercial banks included in the Treasury survey
held $6.4 billion in bills and $11.9 billion in certificates. There-
after holdings of certificates continued to rise while holdings of
Treasury bills decreased. At the end of November 1944, commer-
cial banks held $2.9 billion in bills and $15.9 billion in certificates.
Whether there may have been a disposition to shift funds into still
longer maturities as an alternative to holding them in either excess
reserves or bills is obscured by the over-all growth in the volume of
government securities.
In view of the advantages of holding assets in some other form
than excess reserves, and the absence of any appreciable sacrifice
of liquidity, it is somewhat surprising to find that excess reserves
showed no tendency to disappear. Throughout most of the first
half of 1M3 the weekly total of member bank excess reserves fluc-
tuated between $1.5 and $2.3 billion. Thereafter they declined,
but it was not until December that they fell below $1 billion.
Excess reserves were chieRy concentrated, however, in country
banks. At the middle of December 1944 excess reserves were di~­



















On the average, country banks at the end of 1944 held excess
resen'es amounting to approximately $140,000 per bank. No en-
tirely satisfactory explanation has been offered of why excess
reserves of these proportions continued to be maintained. In some
instances banks subject to excess profits taxation are said to have
68 Federal Rtitmre Bulletin (Februar)' 1945) p. 145.
83felt that the net gain from holding bills rather than cash was not
worth the bother involved. Country banks, accustomed to a con-
siderably higher rate of return, may have found the rate of return
insufficient to attract them and also may have been deterred by lack
of familiarity with the discount feature of Treasury bills. Others
clung to the view that it was desirable to have a certain amouut of
excess reserves in the accustomed form.
There was, nevertheless, a tendency for the total volume of excess
reserves to move irregularly downward. Their amount, after fluc-
tuating for a time about a reduced total, repeatedly broke through
to a new level. How far this downward progression would con-
tinue was never cJltirely clear. The fact that excess reseJ"Ves still
exist among smaller banks does not, in any case, obscure the success
of the Treasury bill policy in helping to eliminate them among the
largest banks and to reduce them among others.
IN REVIEW
The most conspicuous banking change since the start of the war
has been the growth in holdings of Treasury obligations, which
rose from 40 percent of the earning assets of all commercial banks
in June 1939 to 71 percent five }'ears later. During the same period
the volume of other types of bank investments and loans declined
or remained approximately unchanged. As a result, only a small
proportion of commercial bank assets are vulnerable to a drop in
commodity prices or agricultuTaI land values such as occurred after
the last war. Furthermore, the bulk of bank assets are no longer
in a fonn likely to contract so abruptly in a period of business
recession as they did in the early thirties.
The average maturity of assets has become shorter since 1939,
with a pronounced increase in the proportion of securities matur-
ing within one year and a sharp reduction in those maturing in ten
years or longer. The rise in the proportion of short-term Treasury
obligations to total bank assets has kept close pace with the decline
in the proportion of cash. In June 1944 the sum of cash and short-
term Treasury securities held by alJ insured Lanks amounted to
38.6 percent of assets compared with 33.:i perceut five years earlier.
It is safe to say that today many bankers feel more oppressed by an
excess than by a deficiency of liquidity. And on the basis of ClIS-
84tomary standards of excellence, the quality of bank. assets seems
higher today than ever before.
As in the last war period the entry of banks into the Federal
Resen'e S}'stem has been stimulated; membership in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation has also increased. By the end of
1949, 48 percent of all commercial banks and over 87 percent of all
commercial bank deposit .. were embraced in the Reserve System,
while over 98 percent of bank deposits were in banks which were
members of the FDIC.
During the last war the number of commercial banks increased
by nearly 2,000, while in this war there has been a substantial
decrease. Total deposits, howeYer, hayc grown more rapidly in this
period than they did from 19I4 to 1920. As a result of the decline
in number of banks and the growth in deposits. the average com-
mercial bank at the end of 1943 was fh'e times as large as at the
postwar peak in 1920, and nearly twice as large as in June 1939.
By the end of June 1943 there were 15 banks with assets of a bil·
lion dollars or more, compared with 8 in June 1939, and there were
423 banks with assets in excess of $25 million. compared with 262
in 1939. Yet the growth of the largest banks has not kept pace with
the growth of banks in other size categories; in 1939 the IO largest
banks held 25 percent of all commercial bank assets, while by 1943
their share had declined to 23 percent. The increase in average size
was greatest for country banks and least for central reserve cit}'
banks - just the opposite of what happened in the years between
1920 and 1939.
The responsibilities imposed upon the banks for helping to
assure an ample supply of ready funds for financing the war effort,
which Was the announced objecth'e of banking policy, have brought
with them a rise in the proportion of highest grade assets in bank
portfolios, an increase in the average size of banks and higher net
earnings. As judged by all conventional tests, these are the charac-
teristics of strong and vigorous banking institutions. They are the
outward, if not entirely conclusive, signs of greater safety and secu-
rity than existed either at the end of the last war or at the start of
the present war.
At the same time, however, the character of banking has dras-
tically altered, for the war accelerated a trend that has prevailed
since the last war. Banks have now become chiefly custodians of
85Federal debt, instead of being concerned mainly with furnishing
working capital for commerce and industry. Because of the changes
that have taken place the future of banking is linked, in large meas-
ure, to the future of the Federal securities market. And through
this relationship and because of the duties the Reserve Banks have
assumed vis a vis the securities market, the Federal Reserve System
has come to occupy a position of unprecedented importance in the
preservation of the safety and liquidity of the nation's banks.
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Work of the National Bureau of Economic Research
I. The object of the National Bureau of Economic Research is to ascertain and to
present to the public important economic facts and their interpretation in a scientific
and impartial manner. The Board of Directors is charged with the responsibility of
ensuring that the work of the Bureau is carried on in strict conformity with this object.
2. To this end the Board of Directors shall appoint one or more Directors of
Research.
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ceming researches to be instituted.
4. No report shall be published until the Director or Directors of Research shall
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data and their utilization in the report. the nature and treatment of the problems
involved. the main conclusions and such other information as in their opinion would
serve to determine the suitability of the report for publication in accordance with the
principles of the Bureau.
5. A ropy of any manuscript proposed for publication shall also be submitted to
each member of the Board. For each manuscript to be so submitted a special com-
mittee shall be appointed by the President. or at his designation by the Executive
Director. consisting of three Directors selected as nearly as may be one from each
general division of the Board. The names of the special manuscript committee shall
be stated to each Director when the summary and report described in paragraph (4)
aresent him. It shall be the duty of each member of the committee to read the manu-
acript. If each member of the special committee signifies his approval within thirty
days. the manuscript may be published. If each member of the special committee has
notsignified his approval within thirty days of the transmittal of the report and manu·
script. the Director of Research shall then notify each member of the Board. requCllting
approval or disapproval of publication. and thirty additional days shall be grdnted for
this purpose. The manuscript shall then not be published unless at least a majority
of theentire Board and a two-thirds majority of those memben of the Board who shall
have voted on the proposal within the time fixed for the receipt of votes on the pub·
lication proposed shall have approved.
6. No manuscript may be published. though approved by each member of the
special committee. until forty·five days have elapsed from the transmittal of the sum-
mary and rcpon. The interval is allowed for the receipt of any memorandum of dis-
sent or reservation, together with a brief statement of his reasons. that any member
may wish to express: and such memorandum of dissent or reservation shall be pub-
lished with the manuscript If he so dCllires. Publication does not. however. imply that
each member of the Board has read the manuscript. or that either members of the
Board in general. or of the special committee. have passed upon its validity in every
detail.
7. A copy of this resolution shall. unless otherwise determined by the Board. be
printed in each copy of every National Bureau book.
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